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The professional forecasters’ inability to anticipate macroeconomic recessions is well documented. The 
literature has found that aggregate or consensus forecasts are too optimistic before downturns and too 
pessimistic before recoveries. This paper explores whether this result also holds with individual data. Using a 
Spanish survey of professional forecasters conducted by Funcas, I find that forecasters are indeed too optimistic 
before recessions for two reasons. First, strong herding behaviour around the consensus forecast prevents those 
forecasters perceiving the early signs of a recession from adjusting their expectations as much as needed to 
predict it. And second, some forecasters put too much weight on the most recent developments when producing 
their forecasts and fail to fully account for the reversion to the mean embedded in the data generating process.  
Both factors lead to negative forecast errors when a recession occurs. Consequently, professional forecasters 
could improve their forecasting performance by placing less weight on indicators from the recent past and by 
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Professional macroeconomic forecasters are experts that predict where the economy of a country, region or the 
world is going. They are typically econometricians or statisticians working for private companies or public 
institutions.2 Their views are highly appreciated in financial and policy circles as they provide valuable insights 
on future economic developments. For this reason, the US Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the 
Bank of Japan and the Bank of England, among others, conduct surveys of professional forecasters regularly, 
typically with a quarterly frequency. And the results of these surveys are used as an input to inform decisions 
by policy-makers. 
 
But how accurate these professional forecasters are? There is a developing literature on forecasting evaluation 
and performance applied to the predictions of professional forecasters with mixed results. Some authors have 
found that these predictions are irrational (Ager et al., 2009, Rossi and Sekhposyan, 2016, An et al. (2018), 
2018, Gelain et al., 2019), biased (Bonham and Cohen, 2001, Harvey and Newbold, 2003, Garcia and 
Manzanares, 2007, Capistran and Timmermann, 2009, Andrade and Le Bihan, 2013, Best and Kapinos, 2018, 
Ramos-Herrera and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2018, Rossi and Sekhposyan, 2018) or inferior to alternatives (Wieland 
and Wolters, 2011, Baghestani, 2019, Brave et al., 2019, Davig and Hall, 2019, Galbraith and van Norden, 
2019). Others have argued that professional forecasts are rational (Deschamps and Ioannidis, 2013, Wang and 
Lee, 2014, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015, El-Shagi, 2018), unbiased (Croushore, 2010, Frenkel et al., 
2011) and perform well compared to alternatives (Ang et al., 2007, Reifschneider and Tulip, 2007, Rubaszek 
and Skrzypcznski, 2008, Chauvet and Potter, 2013, Grothe and Meyler, 2018, Zhang, 2018, Garciga and Knotek, 
2019, Gelfer, 2019). Finally, some papers explored performance at the individual level and found significant 
heterogeneity, with some forecasters performing much better than others (Dovern and Weisser, 2011, Poncela 
et al., 2011, Conflitti et al., 2015, López Pérez, 2016a, Diebold and Shin, 2018). 
 
A recent paper by Dovern and Jannsen (2017) shed new light on this debate. They used Consensus Economics’ 
aggregate forecasts of annual real GDP growth for 19 developed countries over the sample 1990-2013 and found 
that their bias depends on the phase of the economic cycle: forecasts are unbiased during expansions, way too 
optimistic before recessions and mildly pessimistic before recoveries. In other words, forecasters are unable to 
predict the turning points of the economic cycle. They cannot predict recessions.3 
 
I build upon Dovern and Jannsen’ paper along three dimensions. First, I test whether their results with aggregate 
forecasts also apply to individual forecasts or are just the result of an aggregation bias (Keane and Runkle, 1990, 
Bonham and Cohen, 2001). If, for instance, at the end of an economic expansion, half of the forecasters predict 
the start of a recession correctly while the other half are inattentive and forecast that the expansion would go 
on, the aggregate forecast would be too optimistic when the recession hits. But this does not mean that 
professional forecasters cannot predict recessions, simply that there is significant heterogeneity among them. In 
the appendix of their paper, Dovern and Jannsen used individual forecasts from the US SPF to investigate 
whether their results hold at the individual level. However, as I showed in a previous paper (López Pérez, 
2016b), surveys like the US SPF or the European Central Bank’s SPF may be subject to important sample-
composition effects at the turns of the business cycle, and Dovern and Jannsen did not control for them. In this 
paper I use a different database of individual forecasts that is not affected by sample-composition effects at the 
turns of the business cycle. 
 
 
2 For an incomplete list of the professional forecasters surveyed by the European Central Bank see 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/ecb_surveys/survey_of_professional_forecasters/html/index.en.html. For a list of those 
surveyed by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia see https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-
center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/2018/survq318. 
3 This point was also made by Best and Kapinos (2018), for the aggregate forecast of GDP growth obtained from the US 
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). An et al. (2018) found that one-year-ahead aggregate forecasts from the 
Consensus Economics survey accurately predicted 5 out of 153 recessions only. Rudebusch and Williams (2009) concluded 
that “professional forecasters are worse at predicting recessions a few quarters ahead than a simple real time forecasting 
model that is based on the yield spread”. 
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Second, I inform about the reasons why professional forecasters seem unable to predict recessions, a question 
that has even made it to the financial news media recently.4 Some authors have suggested that forecasters are 
rational but inattentive and thereby may fail to take into account useful available data that would help them 
forecast recessions (Nordhaus, 1987, Mankiw and Reis, 2002, Reis, 2006). Others have proposed that 
forecasters are rational but receive noisy information, a feature that may make them too cautious when revising 
their forecasts (Woodford, 2002, Sims, 2003, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012, Dovern, et al., 2015). Finally, 
some have argued that forecasters are irrational because they are too backward-looking (Gelain et al., 2019), 
which may lead to excessive optimism during good times. In this paper I present empirical models that identify 
the main drivers of forecast errors and forecast revisions, which provide additional insights on the channels that 
are preventing professional forecasters from predicting recessions.  
 
And third, I extend the analysis to the subcomponents of GDP: consumption, investment, government 
expenditure, exports and imports. The reason is that professional forecasters may be unable to predict sudden 
shifts in the most volatile components of GDP, like investment and exports, but may be more successful with 
the most persistent ones, like consumption and imports. If this were the case, professional forecasters would be 
able to predict recessions better if they improved the performance of their models for a few clearly identified 
components of GDP.     
 
As a preview, the results of the paper are consistent with the hypothesis that individual forecasters are irrational 
in three ways. First, they seem to be partly backward-looking, a feature that makes them too optimistic before 
recessions. This finding applies to almost all subcomponents of GDP, no matter how volatile they are, 
suggesting that something more fundamental is at the root of the inability to predict the turning points of the 
cycle. Second, they seem to herd around the consensus or average forecast, which reduces the incentives to 
make large forecast revisions when the first signs of a recession appear. And third, forecast revisions are 
autocorrelated at the individual level, a result that is at odds with the hypothesis of rational expectations. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset used. Section 3 presents the 
estimations of empirical models of forecast errors based on Dovern and Jannsen (2017). Section 4 shows the 
estimations of the model of forecast revisions. Section 5 concludes and outlines directions for further research.           
 
2. The data 
 
2.1 The Funcas database 
 
The database used in this paper is maintained by Funcas, a non-profit foundation created by the Spanish 
Federation of Savings Banks. Funcas conducts a survey six times a year to ask professional forecasters located 
in Spain about future expected macroeconomic variables of the Spanish economy. The respondents are mostly 
financial institutions but also universities and non-financial corporations. Annex I lists the names of all the 
contributors to this survey and the date when they first replied. 
 
The variables surveyed by Funcas and used in this paper are the expected annual growth rates of real GDP, 
private consumption, government expenditure, investment, exports and imports. These expectations are for the 
current and the next calendar year. Therefore, they are fixed-event forecasts and the forecast horizon decreases 
during the calendar year. These forecasts are available since May 1999 with the exception of the expected 
growth rate of government expenditure, whose inclusion in the survey questionnaire was discontinued between 
June 1999 and October 2005.5   
 
 
4 See the article “Why are economists so bad at forecasting recessions?” by S. Kennedy and P. Coy, published on 
Bloomberg Businessweek on 28 March 2019. 
5 The Funcas survey also includes expectations of other variables not used in this paper: the annual growth rates of 
investments in machinery and capital goods, construction, national demand, the consumer price index (CPI), the core CPI, 
labour costs and employment, the average unemployment rate, the average current-account balance and the average public 
deficit.         
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Additionally, Funcas surveys forecasts of quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth, quarter-on-quarter growth rates 
of private consumption and quarter-on-quarter CPI inflation.6 These forecasts are not published and Funcas 
kindly made them available upon request under the condition that the individual data cannot be identifiable. 
 
The Funcas survey has advantages and disadvantages with respect to other surveys of professional forecasters. 
Its main disadvantage versus the Consensus Economics survey is that its forecasts are for one country only.7 In 
this regard, it is similar to other widely used surveys like the US SPF or the ECB’s SPF. Its main disadvantage 
versus the SPFs is that the number of forecasters is relatively small: the maximum number of forecasters per 
survey round is 20, in line with the Consensus Economics survey.  
 
On the advantages, the Funcas survey is free of charge, unlike Consensus Economics’; it surveys much more 
variables than the ECB’s SPF, including the components of GDP, which are one of the focuses of this paper; 
the survey is conducted six times a year, versus four times a year in the US SPF and the ECB’s SPF; and it has 
a negligible number of missing observations for active forecasters, unlike the US SPF or the ECB’s SPF, a 
feature that allows the analysis of individual survey data without the need to control for sample-composition 
effects at the turns of the business cycle. 
 
Regarding the length of the forecast horizon, professional forecasters are requested by Funcas to submit 
expectations for the current and the following calendar years in survey rounds from March to December (see 
the months when the survey has been conducted in Annex II). In the surveys taking place in January or February, 
expectations refer to the previous and the current calendar year. There is one exception: in February 2012, 
forecasters submitted forecasts for 2012 and 2013. Therefore, if the horizon length of a forecast for year t 
submitted in February of year t+1 is normalised to zero, the range of forecast horizon lengths goes from 24 
months (forecast for 2013 submitted in February 2012) to 0 months (forecast for year t submitted in February 




Forecasts are subtracted from realisations to compute forecast errors. The realisations are obtained from the 
OECD real-time database, following Dovern and Jannsen. Real-time data is used because forecasters cannot 
predict future methodological changes to the way target variables are calculated (Harvey and Newbold, 2003). 
More precisely, forecasts for year t are compared to the realisation from the vintage of data available in March 
of year t+1, when fourth-quarter data from the previous year is available for the first time.8 
 
2.3 Expansion, recession and recovery years 
 
One of the contributions by Dovern and Jannsen (2017) is to show that the sign of the forecast errors depends 
on the phase of the business cycle: close to zero during expansions, negative in recessions and positive in 
recoveries. To that end, they defined year t as a recession year if real GDP in t is lower than in t-1. Year t is 
defined as a recovery year if real GDP in t is higher than in t-1 and the latter is a recession year. Finally, year t 
is defined as an expansion year if real GDP in t is higher than in t-1 and the latter is not a recession year. 
 
In this paper I follow Dovern and Jannsen and use the most recent vintage available of GDP data to identify 
expansions, recessions and recoveries in the Spanish economy. Revised data is obtained from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED database). Figure 1 shows Spanish real GDP growth rates. According to the 
 
6 Quarter-on-quarter forecasts have replaced year-on-year forecasts for each quarter since September 2010.  
7 It may be argued that another disadvantage of the Funcas survey versus the Consensus Economics survey is that the latter 
is conducted monthly. However, ECB (2019) shows that 74% (64%) of a sample of professional forecasters update their 
short-term (medium-term) forecasts of GDP growth once a quarter, while only 19% (11%) update once a month.   
8 There were a few years when fourth-quarter data of real GDP was available in February according to the OECD real-time 
database. This data, however, is disregarded for the calculation of the realisations because it was inconsistent with the first 
vintage of data for the previous full calendar year published by the Bank of Spain in the March edition of its Economic 
Bulletin. The data available in March, according to the OECD database, is always consistent with the data published by the 
Bank of Spain.   
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metric used, there are four recession years in the sample (2009, 2011, 2012 and 2013), two recovery years (2010 
and 2014) and the rest are expansion years. 
 
Figure 1. Real GDP growth rates in Spain (revised data) 
Source: Own calculations based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis. 
 
2.4 Forecast errors 
 
As said above, forecast errors are defined as follows: 
 
FEi,x,t,h = Rx,t – Fi,x,t,h                                                                                                                                        (1) 
 
where FEi,x,t,h is the forecast error made by forecaster i when predicting variable x for year t with a forecast-
horizon length of h months, Rx,t is the realisation of variable x in year t, and Fi,x,t,h is the forecast submitted by 
forecaster i of variable x for year t with a forecast horizon length of h months. Average forecast errors by forecast 
horizon can be obtained by running the following regression: 
 
FEi,x,t,h = Σh Dh αh + εt          for h=0,1,2,..,24.                                                                                                (2)  
                                                                                                                                                   
where Dh is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the forecast horizon length is h and a value of 0 
otherwise, αh is a horizon-specific constant term and εt is a zero-mean disturbance. The model is estimated by 
pooled OLS (ordinary least squares) over a sample from May 1999 to January 2017. The standard errors of the 
αh have been computed with bootstrap9 due to the likely presence of cross-correlation and heteroskedasticity in 
the error term: cross-correlation may arise because of the fixed-event nature of the forecasts, with several 
forecasts for the same variable submitted in different months, and heteroskedasticity may arise because the 
variance of the error term is likely to increase with the length of the forecast horizon (Ager et al., 2009). 
 
Figure 2 shows the regression results for GDP-growth forecasts. The black solid line depicts αh for each h. The 
black dotted lines are the bounds of their 95% confidence intervals. Average forecast errors are very close to 
zero for the shortest forecast horizons, but they became slightly negative for the longest ones. When the same 
regression is run for forecasts whose target year is a recession year, I obtained the estimates shown in red: much 
larger negative forecast errors for horizons longer than 14 months, a result that is consistent with the asymmetric 
forecast errors documented by Harvey and Newbold (2003) and Galbraith and van Norden (2019). For recovery 
years, the regression results are shown in blue: significantly positive forecast errors for horizons longer than 6 
 
9 Across 3000 replications with 3054 observations each. 
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months. Finally, for expansion years, average forecast errors (in green) are statistically very close to zero for all 
horizons. 
 
These results are consistent with those reported by Dovern and Jannsen using the Consensus Economics survey: 
professional forecasters are too optimistic before recessions, somewhat pessimistic before recoveries and 
unbiased during expansions. As the average size of the forecast errors before recessions is much larger than 
before recoveries, forecasts appear to be biased on average, especially for the longest horizons. 
 
Figure 2. Average forecast errors for real GDP growth by horizon lengths and phase of the business cycle. 
 
 
Annex III shows the same statistics for the subcomponents of GDP: private consumption, investment, 
government expenditure, exports and imports. The pattern of forecast errors for consumption, investment, 
exports and imports across the business cycle is very similar to that of GDP’s, with negative forecast errors 
during recession years and positive forecast errors during recoveries. Having said this, some interesting results 
arise. Forecasts of growth rates of exports and imports are too high not only during recessions but also during 
expansions. This result is at odds with Dovern and Jannsen’s conclusion that professional forecasts are unbiased 
conditional on the economy staying in an expansion.  
 
Similarly, growth forecasts of government expenditure appear to be too low not only during recessions, when 
countercyclical fiscal policies are likely to be implemented, but also during expansions. This is another finding 
that is not consistent with the hypothesis that professional forecasts are unbiased during expansions. Instead, 
forecasts of GDP growth during expansions happen to be unbiased because the negative biases in exports and 
imports and the positive bias in government expenditure broadly cancel out.  
 
Finally, a caveat must be made about the differences between the two recoveries in the sample, 2010 and 2014. 
As shown in Figure 1, GDP growth in 2010 was only 0.01% in the revised dataset and it was negative in the 
real-time first estimate published in March 2011 (-0.15%). Therefore, 2010 looks rather different in many ways 
when compared to a standard recovery year like 2014, whose GDP growth rate was well above zero (1.38%). 
For example, the average forecast error of the growth rate of investment in 2010 is negative for forecast horizon 
lengths longer than 7 months. The heterogeneity across the two recoveries increases the uncertainty surrounding 







3. The empirical model of the forecast errors 
 
3.1. The Dovern and Jannsen (2017) model 
 
Dovern and Jannsen moved past the simple model presented in the previous section and estimate a model of the 
forecast errors with individual effects and interactions between the phase of the business cycle and the length 
of the forecast horizon. Therefore, I estimate the following model:  
 
FEi,GDP,t,h = Σi αi Di + (β1 + γ2 h) Drecession + (β2 + γ3 h) Drecovery + (δ1 + γ4 h) Drecession started +                 
               + (δ2 + γ5 h) Drecovery started + γ1 h + εt               for i=1,2,3,…23                                                          (3) 
 
where FEi,GDP,t,h is the forecast error made by forecaster i when predicting GDP growth for target year t with a 
forecast-horizon length of h months, Di is an individual dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for forecaster i 
and 0 otherwise, h is the length of the forecast horizon in months, Drecession and Drecovery are dummy variables that 
take a value of 1 if the target year of the forecast is a recession or a recovery year respectively, Drecession started and 
Drecovery started are dummy variables that take a value of 1 if the forecast was submitted during a recession or a 
recovery year respectively, and εt is a random disturbance with zero mean. α1,…, α23, β1, β2, δ1, δ2, γ1, γ2, γ3, γ4 
and γ5 are the model parameters, estimated by pooled OLS with the same sample used in subsection 2.4. Table 
1 shows the estimated coefficients and their p-values based on bootstrap standard errors.10 
 
Model 1 (M1) is the result of imposing the restriction that all the parameters in (3) are equal to zero with the 
exception of a constant term. This constant is negative and statistically significant, which means that 
professional forecasters were 4 basis points too optimistic on average when they predicted Spanish GDP growth. 
In model 2 (M2) the constant is replaced with 23 individual effects (αi) to account for micro-heterogeneity in 
pooled estimators (Bonham and Cohen, 2001) and β1 is no longer assumed to be zero. The estimated β1 is 
negative and statistically significant, which means that forecast errors of GDP growth are almost 1 percentage 
point lower on average when the target year is a recession year.  
 
In model 3 (M3), β2 is also estimated. It is found to be positive and statistically significant, suggesting that 
forecast errors of GDP growth are 0.13 percentage points higher on average when the target year is a recovery 
year. Model 4 (M4) allows for richer interactions between the phases of the business cycle and the forecast 
errors by estimating the parameters δ1 and δ2. In M4 the estimated β1 parameter is three times larger in absolute 
value than in M2 or M3: forecasts of a recession year during the last expansion year are biased upwards by more 
than 2.5 percentage points on average. When the recession starts, the forecasts of a recession year have a much 
smaller upward bias (β1 + δ1), around half a percentage point: forecasters are initially surprised by the recession 
but once it hits they revise their forecasts significantly lower.11 While the economy is in the last year of a 
recession, forecasts of the following year (a recovery year) are too pessimistic. The bias (β2 + δ1) is around half 
a percentage point. Once the recovery has started, forecasts of the recovery year show a smaller bias (β2 + δ2), 
less than three tenths of a percentage point. Again, forecasters are surprised by the recovery but, once the 
recovery starts, they revise their forecasts upwards. 
 
M2, M3 and M4 allow for level shifts in the forecast errors as the economy moves through the business cycle. 
However, Figure 2 showed that the absolute value of the average forecast error increases with the length of the 
forecast horizon when the business cycle is controlled for. Therefore, Model 5 (M5) estimates equation (3) 
without restrictions, introducing the effects of the horizon lengths in two ways: a linear effect (γ1) and interaction 
effects with the dummies of the phases of the business cycle (γ2, γ3, γ4 and γ5). The linear effect is found to be 
statistically lower than zero but economically insignificant, one tenth of a percentage point for a horizon length  
 
10 The p-values shown are based on bootstrapping the original sample without imposing clusters or blocks. However, 
forecast errors are likely to be positively autocorrelated and the bootstrap technique breaks this dependence. Therefore, as 
a robustness check, clusters based on the variable FEi,GDP,t,h were also used to do the bootstrapping. The resulting standard 
errors (not shown) are slightly larger than the ones reported in Table 1 but all the qualitative and quantitative findings 
remain.  
11 These downward revisions may be partly driven by informational effects from expansionary monetary-policy 
announcements in response to the recession (Mitchell and Pearce, 2019). 
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Table 1. Estimation results of the empirical model of GDP-growth forecast errors. 
 
          
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. Models M2 to M9 include individual dummy variables. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
-0.876 -0.847 -2.613 0.436 -0.147 -0.603 -0.703 -1.425
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.131 -1.626 -0.007 -0.599 -0.323 -0.469 -0.420
(0.00) (0.00) (0.92) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2.125 -0.013 -0.372 0.256 -0.501 -1.063
(0.00) (0.86) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00)
1.905 -0.287 -0.917 -0.358 -0.892 -0.787
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.012 -0.016 -0.014 0.013 -0.017
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00)
-0.001
(0.00)
-0.194 -0.174 -0.141 -0.073 -0.172
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
-0.003
(0.01)
-0.078 -0.076 -0.059 -0.190 -0.127
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.005
(0.00)
0.112 0.114 0.086 0.157 0.138
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.002
(0.19)
0.133 0.101 0.061 0.181 0.072



























Observations 3054 3054 3054 3037 3037 2808 2808 2808 2808





































of 10 months. Put differently, the forecasts have a negligible upward bias during expansions. Besides, all the 
effects of the business cycle on the forecast errors described in M4 are captured in M5 by the interaction effects 
with the length of the forecast horizon. γ2 is negative and large (forecasters do not anticipate the recessions), γ4 
is positive but smaller in absolute value than γ2 (forecasters revise their forecasts downwards once the recession 
has started but the revisions are too mild to eliminate the forecast error, as found by An, Jalles and Loungani, 
2018, and Galbraith and van Norden 2019), γ3 is negative but smaller in absolute value than γ2 (forecasters do 
not anticipate the recovery), and γ5 is positive and slightly larger than γ4 (forecasters are slow to revise their 
forecasts upwards once the recovery has started). 
 
Models M1 to M5 were estimated by Dovern and Jannsen with forecasts errors of GDP growth from the 
Consensus Economics Survey and the results obtained here are fully consistent with theirs. Annex IV shows the 
estimation results for the forecast errors of the subcomponents of GDP: private consumption, investment, 
government expenditure, exports and imports. For the forecast errors of the growth rate of private consumption, 
investment, exports and imports, the results are qualitatively similar to those obtained with GDP growth. 
Unsurprisingly, the results for government expenditure are somewhat different: forecasters predict growth rates 
of government expenditure that are too low during expansions and the bias increases with the length of the 
forecast horizon (γ1 = 0.037), while this bias is negative for the rest of the variables. 
 
3.2. The impact of past growth rates of real GDP on subsequent forecast errors    
 
Dovern and Jannsen assumed in their model that the effect of the length of the forecast horizon on the forecast 
error is linear conditional on remaining in the same phase of the business cycle. However, this assumption fails 
to capture dynamics like those presented in Figure 3. The chart on the left shows all the available individual 
forecasts of GDP growth for target year 2013. Each dot is a different forecast. The dots closer to the right edge 
of the chart represent forecasts that were submitted earlier and thereby have a longer forecast horizon, while 
those closer to the left edge were submitted later and their horizon is shorter. The relationship between the 
forecast error for target year 2013 and the length of the forecast horizon is clearly non-linear. The forecasts with 
the longest horizons, which were submitted at the beginning of 2012, turned out to be too optimistic (both 2012 
and 2013 were recession years). These forecasts gave rise to large negative errors. But by the end of 2012 most 
forecasters had changed their minds and were very pessimistic about GDP growth in 2013, so pessimistic that 
their forecasts were biased downwards (positive forecast errors). This evidence is at odds with the assumption 
of a linear relationship between forecast errors and the length of the forecast horizon.     
 
Figure 3. Individual forecast errors for real GDP growth by horizon lengths for target years 2013 and 2007. 
                      
                                         2013                                                                                     2007 
   
 
This hump-shaped non-linearity does not appear in recession years only. The right-hand side of the chart shows 
the individual forecasts of GDP growth for 2007, an expansion year. Forecasters were too pessimistic about 
2007 at the beginning of 2006, resulting in positive forecast errors. But most of the forecasters became a little 
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too optimistic by spring 2007, and their predictions exhibited negative forecast errors. This J-shaped pattern is 
not consistent with the assumption that the effect of the length of the forecast horizon on the forecast error is 
linear. 
 
Similar examples can be found for the subcomponents of GDP. Annex IV shows hump-shaped relationships 
between forecast errors and the length of the forecast horizon for consumption in 2003, investment in 2013, 
government expenditure in 2012, exports in 2006 and imports in 2013. The model presented in the previous 
subsection needs to be extended to capture these patterns. 
 
The simplest extension to the model could be to add the length of the forecast horizon squared as an additional 
regressor, yielding a quadratic relationship between the forecast error and the horizon length. I will come back 
to this extension shortly but first let me investigate a more interesting alternative: could it be the case that 
professional forecasters are backward-looking and put too much weight on the most recent macroeconomic 
developments? On the left-hand side of Figure 3 I discussed that forecasters in early 2012 were too optimistic 
about GDP growth in 2013. The reason could be that the first estimate of GDP growth in 2011, published in 
February 2012, came in at 0.7%. As 2010 was believed to be a recession year at the time, it seemed that the 
recession triggered by the financial crisis was finally over. The positive news might have led to excessive 
upward revisions to GDP-growth forecasts. The large negative forecast errors for horizon lengths between 22 
and 24 months are consistent with this hypothesis. 
 
The optimism, however, was short-lived. In September 2012, the growth rate of GDP in 2011 was revised down 
to 0.4%, and it was revised down again to 0.0% in September 2013. The final figure came in as low as -1.0%. 
Moreover, the first estimate of GDP growth in 2012, published in March 2013, was dismal: -1,4%. The hopes 
of an end to the recession vanished with the eruption of the sovereign debt crisis in the euro area. In this context, 
most professional forecasters might have become too pessimistic about growth in 2013, they revised their 
forecasts downwards too much and, as a result, they made positive forecast errors for horizon lengths lower 
than 17 months. 
 
To test for this kind of irrational backward-lookingness or excessive influence of the latest macroeconomic data 
releases on the forecasts and thereby on the forecast errors, I first investigate the relationship between past 
shocks and subsequent forecast errors with a simple theoretical example. Let’s assume that there are three 
periods in the example: period 0, when the economy is in its steady state, period 1, when a shock hits the 
economy, and period 2, the target period of the forecasts, where another shock occurs. In other words, agents 
try to predict the state of the economy in period 2 after the period 1 shock. Let’s assume that the target variable 
is GDP growth, in deviations from steady state, which follows an AR(1) process: 
 
ΔGDPt = ρΔGDPt-1 + εt                              with 0<ρ<1                                                                                                         (4) 
 
If agents were irrationally backward-looking and used a random walk to forecast the growth rate of GDP in 
period 2, instead of (4), 
 
E1ΔGDP2 = ΔGDP1                                                                                                                                              (5) 
  
the forecast error would then be: 
 
ΔGDP2 – E1ΔGDP2 = (ρ-1)ΔGDP1 + ε2                                                                                                                (6) 
 
Therefore, the regression coefficient of forecast errors on past GDP growth would be negative as long as GDP 
growth were stationary. 
 
If agents were rational but inattentive, they would observe the shock ε1 with an individual probability τ (0 < τ < 
1). If they observed the shock they would update their expectations optimally: 
 




And their forecast errors would be unpredictable. But with probability 1-τ they would not observe the shock and 
they would not update, 
 
E1ΔGDP2 = 0                                                                                                                                                          (8) 
 
because GDP growth was in its steady state in period 0. For the agents that do not update, their forecast error in 
period 2 is: 
 
ΔGDP2 – E1ΔGDP2 = ρΔGDP1 + ε2                                                                                                                       (9) 
  
In this case, if agents were rationally inattentive, the regression coefficient of forecast errors on past GDP growth 
would be positive as long as GDP growth were persistent. 
 
Finally, let’s consider the case where agents are rational but receive a noisy signal in period 1 (assume for 
simplicity that they observe GDP growth at period 0): 
 
ΔGDP1i = ΔGDP1 + η1i                                                                                                                                                                                                                    (10) 
 
where η1i is a zero-mean disturbance, uncorrelated to ΔGDP1 and interpreted as the noise that agent i receives.12 
The forecast of GDP growth in period 2 would be as follows: 
 
E1iΔGDP2 = (1-α)E0ΔGDP2 + αρ(ΔGDP1 + η1i)       with 0≤α≤1                                                                                               (11) 
 
where α is the Kalman gain. If there were no noise, 1-α = η1i = 0, the growth rate of GDP in period 1 would be 
observable and the expected forecast error would be zero (the first term on the right side of equation (11) is zero 
because there were neither shocks nor noise before period 1). As long as there is noise in the signal the 
forecasters received in period 1, their forecast errors would be:  
 
ΔGDP2 – E1iΔGDP2 = (1-α)ρΔGDP1 - αρη1i + ε2                                                                                                                     (12) 
  
If agents were rational but received noisy information, the regression coefficient of forecast errors on past GDP 
growth would be positive as long as GDP growth is persistent (ρ > 0). 
 
Following the intuition from this simple theoretical example I explore the empirical relationship between 
forecast errors and past growth rates of GDP. To this end, I start from Dovern and Jannsen’s model as a baseline 
because the forecast horizon length of the predictions in the Funcas database is not always one and the horizon 
length could affect the size of potential biases (Ager et al., 2009). Then, I add eight additional regressors: the 
real-time estimates of quarterly GDP growth rates over the previous eight quarters for which data was available 
at the time of producing each forecast.13 These regressors are predetermined at the time of producing the 
forecasts: 
 
FEi,GDP,t,h = Σi αi Di + (β1 + γ2 h) Drecession + (β2 + γ3 h) Drecovery + (δ1 + γ4 h) Drecession started +                 
               + (δ2 + γ5 h) Drecovery started + γ1 h + Σj λj ΔGDPj + εt             for i=1,…,23 and j=1,..,8                        (13) 
    
ΔGDP1 is the real-time estimate of quarterly GDP growth for the most recent quarter available at the time of 
producing the forecast. ΔGDP2 is the real-time estimate of quarterly GDP growth for the quarter before the most 
recent, and so on up to ΔGDP8. If forecasters are irrationally backward-looking, the estimated λj should be 
statistically lower than zero.14 If forecasters are rational but inattentive, the estimated λj should be statistically 
 
12 Aruoba et al. (2016) argue that GDP-growth data is a noisy signal of output growth. 
13 The Akaike and Bayesian information criteria selected 8 lags as the more informative specification conditional on a 
maximum of 8 lags to avoid losing too many observations.   
14 Capistran and Timmerman (2009) built a model where forecasters have asymmetric loss functions with heterogeneity. 
In this model, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) showed that past data may be negatively correlated with subsequent 
forecast errors if the degree of asymmetry is non-zero on average. But if that were the case average forecast errors during 
expansions would not remain as close to zero as shown in Figure 2.     
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larger than zero. If forecasters are rational but receive noisy information about GDP growth, the estimated λj 
should be statistically larger than zero as well. If forecasters are rational and there are no information rigidities, 
the estimated λj should not be statistically different from zero. 
 
The estimation results are displayed in column 6 of Table 1 (model M6). The coefficients of six out of eight 
past GDP growth rates are negative, four of them statistically lower than zero. The sum of the eight λj is negative 
and statistically significant. And the effects are economically relevant: a quarterly GDP growth rate of 1% above 
its long-term value causes forecast errors of -0.28 percentage points one quarter later, -0.49 percentage points 
one year later and -1.04 percentage points two years later.  
 
It could be argued that this result may be driven by the presence of several recessions in a relatively short sample: 
conditional on big negative shocks to GDP growth, the correlation between past GDP growth rates and the 
following forecast errors could be negative not only for backward-looking forecasters but also for rational 
forecasters (with or without information rigidities).15 To check whether the negative effect of GDP-growth rates 
on subsequent forecast errors found in model M6 also hold during expansions, I run the same regression with 
interaction terms between past GDP growth rates and the dummy variables Dexpansion, which is equal to 1 if the 
target year is an expansion year and 0 otherwise, Drecession and Drecovery:  
 
FEi,GDP,t,h = Σi αi Di + (β1 + γ2 h) Drecession + (β2 + γ3 h) Drecovery + (δ1 + γ4 h) Drecession started + 
               + (δ2 + γ5 h) Drecovery started + γ1 h + Σj λj,exp Dexpansion GDPj + Σj λj,rece Drecession GDPj + 
               + Σj λj,reco Drecovery GDPj + εt                                                      for i=1,…,23 and j=1,..,8                        (14) 
 
There are 24 λj to be estimated in this model. Therefore, Table 1 only reports its sum for each phase of the 
business cycle (model M7 in Table 1). These sums are statistically lower than zero not only for recessions but 
also for expansions.16 The results are consistent with the hypothesis that the forecasters are backward looking 
and overreact irrationally to short-term macroeconomic developments: when GDP growth is high they revise 
up their forecasts too much and they make negative forecast errors; and when GDP growth is relatively low, 
they revise down their forecasts too much and they make positive forecast errors. These overreactions occur not 
only in recessions, when the estimated effects are stronger, but also in expansions. 17 
 
Another robustness check is done by adding to the right-hand side of equation (13) the quadratic horizon effects 
I mentioned above: 
 
 FEi,GDP,t,h = Σi αi Di + (β1 + γ2 h + γ2squared h2) Drecession + (β2 + γ3 h+ γ3squared h2) Drecovery + 
               + (δ1 + γ4 h+ γ4squared h2) Drecession started + (δ2 + γ5 h+ γ5squared h2) Drecovery started + 
               + γ1 h + γ1squared h2 + Σj λj GDPj + εt                                 for i=1,…,23 and j=1,..,8                         (15) 
 
The results are shown in column 8 of Table 1 (model M8) and are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar 
to those of M6, with most of the estimated λj statistically lower than zero.  
 
A final robustness check is conducted by computing the forecast errors using the revised data from the FRED 
database shown in Figure 1 as realisations of GDP growth. The results are shown in column 9 of Table 1 (model 
M9). Again, most of the estimated λj are lower than zero, a result that is not consistent with rational expectations 
 
15 See, for example, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015): “rejections of the null of full-information rational expectations 
are much more common over short samples in which specific episodes, such as the Volcker disinflation, can have a 
disproportionate influence on measuring the predictability of forecast errors.”. 
16 For recoveries, the sum of the λj is positive but, for the reason explained at the end of the previous section, the uncertainty 
around their point estimates is relatively large: only three of them are statistically different from zero, adding up to -0.125. 
17 I also estimated the model with a restricted sample, including forecasts for target years up to 2008 only, covering a long 
expansion of the Spanish economy. The results are qualitatively the same: a quarterly GDP growth rate of 1% above its 
long-term value causes forecast errors of -0.35 percentage points one year later and -1.18 percentage points two years later. 
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and information rigidities. Thus, the findings models M6, M7, M8 and M9 show evidence that forecasters may 
have behaved in a backward-looking manner by revising their forecasts too aggressively in response to short-
term macroeconomic developments. The same evidence of backward-lookingness and overreaction to recent 
data releases is found for all subcomponents of GDP, a result that suggests this feature does not depend on the 
specific properties of the time series to be predicted (see Annex V).  
 
The results are in line with recent findings reported by Gelain et al. (2019), who found that SPF forecasts are 
consistent with forecasts from a DSGE model with irrational agents that place too much weight on the most 
recent observations when computing their expectations. They also support the findings by Andrade and Le 
Bihan (2013), who pointed out that a model with rational inattention and noisy information cannot generate the 
large degree of persistence of forecast errors observed in the ECB’s SPF. The results are consistent with those 
reported by Ang et al. (2007), who found that inflation forecasts from the Livingston survey are too high after 
high-inflation episodes and too low after low-inflation ones. The results are also closely related to the “excessive 
optimism” displayed by stock-market investors when they forecast stock prices at market peaks (Adam et al., 
2017, Greenwood and Schleifer, 2014). Finally, the results are in line with the “available heuristic” in 
psychology, according to which agents put too much weight on recent events because they are “easily 
accessible” (Koursaros, 2018). 
 
Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) found that aggregate forecast errors of inflation from the US SPF are not 
correlated to past inflation levels, a result that is at odds with the results presented here. I believe there are 
several differences between their paper and this paper that may help explain this discrepancy. First, different 
surveys are used. Second, different variables are predicted. Third, they used average forecasts while individual 
forecasts are considered here. And fourth, they only analysed one forecast horizon length (12 months) while 
many different horizons are used here. This last difference is, in my view, the most relevant because Figure 2 
shows that forecast errors are much larger in absolute terms for forecast horizons longer than 12 months, and 
Ager et al. (2009) found that professional forecasts are more likely to be biased at horizon longer than 12 
months. Interestingly, Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2012) also estimated the effect of past levels of inflation on 
forecasts errors of inflation using the Livingston survey and a survey of forecasts by members of the Federal 
Open-Market Committee. The estimated impact in both cases is negative and statistically significant, as 
described in the present paper. They also obtained negative estimates of the coefficients of past inflation using 
US SPF data when semi-annual forecasts were used instead of quarterly forecasts. Moreover, their results were 
not robust to more general lag specifications of forecast errors and past inflation either. 
 
Hubert and Mirza (2019) used the New Keynesian Phillips Curve framework to find that inflation nowcasts 
from the US SPF can be characterised as a weighted average of past inflation and inflation forecasts one quarter 
ahead. They concluded that professional forecasters are forward-looking because the coefficient of past inflation 
is small (0.2). However, as they also indicated, if forecasts of inflation one quarter ahead embedded information 
from the past, professional forecasters would be more backward-looking than their estimates suggest. As a 
matter of fact, when they replaced one-quarter-ahead forecasts with four-quarter-ahead forecasts, the weight of 
the backward-looking component increased to 0.6. 
 
3.3 Goodness of fit of the extended model vs. the original model 
 
The previous subsection has shown that recent macroeconomic developments help explain forecast errors better 
in a statistical sense. But how big is this improvement in forecasting terms? To answer this question I conducted 
a horse race between model M5 (the estimated original model) on the one hand and the three extensions 
estimated in this paper, M6, M7 and M8, on the other.18 The horse race consists on counting how many times 
the fitted forecast errors from M6, M7 and M8 are closer to the consensus forecast errors than the fitted forecast 
errors of the estimated original model. To make the exercise more interesting I focus on forecast horizon lengths 
longer than 13 months as, not surprisingly, these are the lengths for which the largest forecast errors are made. 
 
 
18 A more formal Diebold-Mariano test is not conducted for two reasons. From a theoretical perspective, the Dieblod-
Mariano test should not be used to compare nested models because the numerator and denominator of the test statistic 
asymptotically converge to zero under the null hypothesis. From an empirical perspective, there are too few observations 
available for each forecast-horizon length.  
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The results are displayed in Figure 4. The extended models beat the original model more than 50% of the time 
for every single horizon longer than 13 months. Putting all these horizon lengths together, M6 and M7 
outperform the original model M5 in 67.4% of the comparisons while M8 does it in 62.7%. Very similar results 
are obtained when the horse race is conducted for the forecast errors of the subcomponents of GDP (see Annex 
VI). The best performing model is the most parsimonious extended model, M6. Its success rate versus the 
original model is 77% for consumption, 65% for investment, 57% for government expenditure, 83% for exports 
and 72% for imports.   
 
These results have important implications for the Funcas survey. They imply that the average or consensus 
forecasts published by Funcas could be improved upon by predicting the forecast errors with models M5 to M8. 
While all the extended models presented here are useful for this task, M6 is the model that does this job the best 
most of the time because it captures how professional forecasters seem to overreact to recent releases of 
macroeconomic data: when recent data releases are relatively good, ceteris paribus, forecast errors become 
more negative, and when recent data releases are relatively bad, forecast errors become more positive. These 
systematic backward-lookingness may be exploited by Funcas to improve the quality of its consensus forecasts.   
 
Figure 4. Percentage of times each extended model outperforms the original model when predicting the 




4. The empirical model of the forecast revisions 
 
The results presented in the previous section are consistent with backward-lookingness or overreaction to the 
recent past by professional forecasters. As described above, the mechanism could work as follows: when the 
latest releases of macroeconomic data are relatively good, forecasters may become too optimistic, revise their 
forecast upwards too much and make negative forecast errors. While the link between data releases and forecast 
errors has been documented in Section 3, I have not shown any evidence of the link between data releases and 
forecast revisions yet.  
 
More importantly, there is a feature of the forecast errors of real GDP growth that cannot be explained by 
backward-lookingness alone: their persistence. Forecast errors typically display positive autocorrelation 
(Capistran and Timmermann, 2009, Bowles et al., 2010, Andrade and Le Bihan, 2013, An et al., 2018, Galbraith 
and van Norden, 2019). If professional forecasters overreacted to high growth rates at the end of an expansion, 
became too optimistic and made negative forecast errors, there is no reason to remain too optimistic once the 
recession hits the economy. Consequently, the time series of forecast errors could quickly converge to zero 
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when forecasters are backward-looking or could even display negative autocorrelation as forecasters produce 
forecasts that are too pessimistic in response to the onset of the recession. 
 
The theories of rational inattention and rational forecasting with noisy signals were developed in part to address 
this issue. Inattentive forecasters may generate persistence in aggregate forecast errors because not all 
forecasters update their forecasts at the same time. Rational forecasters that receive noisy signals may react too 
timidly on average to the signal and, as more information is revealed, they slowly revise their forecasts in the 
same direction during multiple periods. Empirically, however, models incorporating these features are not able 
to generate enough persistence in forecast errors (Andrade and Le Bihan, 2013). 
      
Therefore, there must be another reason for the inertia of forecast errors over time. To explore this issue, the 
next step is to estimate a model of forecast revisions. The estimated model is: 
 
FREVi,GDP,t-k,t = α + Σi αi Di +ρ FREVi,GDP,t-k-x,t-k + (β1 + β2 D2010:9)LFEi,qGDP,t + Σj λj REVGDP,-j,t-k-1,t-1 +  
                        + γ1(Fi,GDP,t-k – Fconsensus,GDP,t-k) + γ2(F i,GDP,t-k – Fgovernment,GDP,t-1) +  
                        + γ3(F i,GDP,t-k – FEUCommission,GDP,t-1) + γ4(F i,GDP,t-k – FIMF,GDP,t-1) + γ5(F i,GDP,t-k – FOECD,GDP,t-1) + εt  
                                                                                                           for i=1,…,23 and j=1,..,4                         (16) 
 
FREVi,GDP,t-k,t is the revision at time t of a forecast last submitted in t-k. The forecast is submitted by forecaster 
i and refers to GDP growth for a calendar year; α is a constant. The αi are individual effects. FREVi,GDP,t-k-x,t-k  is 
the previous revision by forecaster i. It is included in the model because An, Jalles, and Loungani, (2018) found 
that revisions to GDP-growth forecasts display inertia and thereby are autocorrelated. LFEi,qGDP,t is the latest 
GDP-growth forecast error by forecaster i available at the time of the revision of the forecast. I expect β1 to be 
positive because better than expected realisations of GDP growth may trigger upward revisions to GDP 
forecasts. This expectation is based on the relationship between forecast errors of quarterly GDP growth and 
subsequent revisions to GDP-growth forecasts in the Funcas survey shown in Figure 6.19 
 
Figure 6: Relationship between forecast errors of quarterly GDP growth and revisions to GDP forecasts. 
 
                          Year-on-year forecasts                                                Quarter-on-quarter forecasts         
   
 
The revisions used in this section are the changes to GDP-growth forecasts for calendar years, the same forecasts 
used in the previous section, from one survey round to the next, in percentage points. This notwithstanding, in 
this section I am not using the forecast errors employed in Section 3 because they were computed from forecasts 
of GDP growth for calendar years and, if I used them, I would only have one realisation per year. Instead, I 
compute forecast errors of quarterly GDP growth because Funcas also collects individual forecasts for this 
 
19 Berge et al. (2019) and Mitchell and Pearce (2019) also included prior forecast errors in their models of forecast revisions. 
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variable in its survey six times a year, although these forecasts are not published. These forecasts refer to year-
on-year quarterly growth rates before September 2010 and to quarter-on-quarter growth rates thereafter. 
Unfortunately, Funcas was not able to provide these forecasts after July 2013 because it has not stored the 
quarterly forecasts since then. Therefore, the sample used in this section goes from May 1999 to July 2013.20  
 
Figure 6 shows that there may be a positive relationship between forecast errors and subsequent forecast 
revisions, especially for the year-on-year forecasts: when quarterly forecasts are higher than the realisations, the 
forecasts for the calendar years are revised downwards. This relationship seems to be a bit clearer for forecasts 
of the growth rate of consumption (see Annex VII). There are also tentative indications of inattentive forecasters, 
especially for quarter-on-quarter forecasts of GDP growth, because revisions are frequently zero even after 
relatively large forecast errors. 
 
To capture the shift in September 2010 from year-on-year forecasts of quarterly GDP growth to quarter-on-
quarter forecasts, a dummy variable, D2010:9, is included in equation (16). It is 0 before September 2010 and 1 
thereafter. I expect β2 to be negative and offset β1 at least partially, if not totally, because forecast errors of 
quarter-on-quarter growth rates may be attributed more to transitory short-term volatility than to persistent shifts 
in medium-term growth, and thus may trigger smaller revisions, if any, to forecasts of calendar years (Croushore, 
2010).  
 
REVGDP,-j,t-k-1,t-1, with j from 1 to 4, are the revisions between t-k and t-1 to the latest four realisations of the level 
of quarterly GDP, in percentage points, available at the time of the forecast revision. I expect that the four λj 
may be positive, because positive revisions to past GDP may be an indication that the economy is in better shape 
than previously assumed and may trigger upward revisions to forecasts of future GDP growth. Revisions to 
released GDP data are obtained from the OECD real-time database. To avoid mixing revisions to released GDP 
data, which may trigger forecast revisions by forecasters, with methodological changes that may cause jumps 
in revised data, which are unlikely to cause forecast revisions, I define methodological changes as revisions of 
more than 10 percentage points to GDP data. Revisions of more than 10 percentage points to released GDP data 
took place in February 2002 (the euro changeover) but also in September 1999, September 2002, June 2005 and 
December 2011. These very large revisions are excluded from the analysis.21   
 
Fi,GDP,t-k – Fconsensus,GDP,t-k is the difference between the previous GDP-growth forecast by forecaster i and the 
latest consensus forecast available, i.e. the average forecast from the previous survey round. If, for strategic 
reasons, forecasters try to submit predictions that are relatively close to the consensus forecast, a behaviour 
commonly known as herding, γ1 should be negative (Morris and Shin, 2002, Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012). 
Rational forecasters have no reason to herd. Therefore, if the forecasters in the Funcas database were rational 
but inattentive or were rational forecasters with noisy information, γ1 would be zero. But if the forecasters 
displayed some form of irrationality, e.g. fears of making large forecast errors when everybody else is 
forecasting accurately, herding could appear. Importantly, herding around the consensus forecast may amplify 
the inertia of both individual and average forecast errors (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2012), a feature that 
could explain, if γ1 < 0, why backward-looking forecasters that overreact to recent data releases make persistent 
forecast errors.  
 
The forecasters surveyed by Funcas could also display herding behaviour around the latest forecast of GDP 
growth from the Spanish government (Fgovernment,GDP,t-1), from the European Commission (FEUCommission,GDP,t-1), 
from the International Monetary Fund (FIMF,GDP,t-1) or from the OECD (FOECD,GDP,t-1) at the time of the revision 
to the forecast.22 If that were the case, γ2, γ3, γ4, γ5 would be lower than zero. 
 
The information assumption made here is that all variables published before the month of a Funcas survey round 
are known to the forecasters participating in the round. All the information available during the month of the 
survey round is assumed to be unknown to the survey participants until the next survey round.  
 
 
20 The quarterly forecasts submitted for the September 2008 and November 2009 surveys were not available either. 
21 Methodological changes to the private consumption series are identified to occur in September 1999, February 2002, 
April 2003, June 2005 and December 2011. 
22 All the forecasts from the Spanish government and international organisations were also provided by Funcas. 
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The results of estimating equation (16) by pooled OLS with bootstrap standard errors are shown in the first three 
columns of Table 2.23 The results in the first column are the estimated coefficients when the individual effects, 
αi, are zero and there is no inertia in forecast revisions, ρ=0 . In the second column, the model includes individual 
effects and the constant, α, is excluded, but there is still no inertia in forecast revisions. In the third column, the 
model allows for individual effects and inertia in forecast revisions. In all three cases, as expected, the estimated 
β1 is positive, statistically significant and economically relevant: when professional forecasters receive a one-
percentage-point surprise to the year-on-year growth rate of quarterly GDP they revise up their forecasts for the 
calendar year by around 0.4 percentage points. Furthermore, β1 + β2 is statistically equal to zero, which suggest 
that the revisions by professional forecasters are not triggered by a surprise in just one quarter but by a sequence 
of news over several quarters.24     
 




Note: P-values in parenthesis. 
 
23 Bootstrap standard errors are needed because model errors are heteroskedastic (more variance in more volatile years) 
and cross-correlated (revisions of forecasts one and two calendar years ahead have typically the same sign).    
24 The p-values of the F-test of the null hypothesis β1 + β2 = 0 are 0.60, 0.59 and 0.10 for the models in columns 1, 2 and 
3 respectively. 
 
GDP                     
(No individual 
effects)
GDP                     
(Individual 
effects)
GDP                     
(Individual 
effects)
C                        
(No individual 
effects)
C                         
(Individual 
effects)





0.427 0.441 0.334 0.200 0.221 0.277
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.479 -0.488 -0.484 -0.303 -0.338 -0.344
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.080 0.067 -0.017 -0.107 -0.119 -0.143
(0.28) (0.36) (0.81) (0.40) (0.36) (0.26)
0.087 0.084 0.067 -0.089 -0.087 -0.098
(0.15) (0.16) (0.25) (0.45) (0.47) (0.40)
-0.254 -0.258 -0.221 0.289 0.281 0.313
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
-0.077 -0.063 -0.022 0.156 0.178 0.196
(0.35) (0.45) (0.78) (0.11) (0.08) (0.04)
-0.684 -0.711 -0.774 -0.657 -0.689 -0.687
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.092 -0.090 -0.036 0.088 0.091 0.097
(0.00) (0.00) (0.23) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.148 -0.152 -0.144 -0.071 -0.075 -0.059
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.14)
0.003 0.006 -0.003 -0.267 -0.266 -0.265
(0.95) (0.90) (0.95) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.046 -0.043 -0.016 -0.051 -0.045 -0.042
(0.31) (0.35) (0.72) (0.08) (0.11) (0.17)
-0.031 -0.037
(0.00) (0.00)
Observations 1728 1728 1607 1289 1289 1188


















The second interesting result is that there is strong evidence of herding behaviour around the consensus forecast, 
as γ1 is negative, statistically significant and very large. When the consensus forecast is above an individual 
forecast by one percentage point, the forecaster who submitted such forecast revises it up by around 0.7 
percentage points in the next survey round.25 This feature helps explain persistent forecast errors in the presence 
of forecasters that overreact to the recent past. There seem to be herding effects around the forecasts submitted 
by the European Commission as well, but the quantitative effects are negligible.  
 
Another finding not consistent with forecast rationality is the statistical significance of previous forecast 
revisions in column 3, Revisions of rational forecasters should be uncorrelated with the information available 
at the time of the previous revision, but these results show that positive revisions are more likely to be followed 
by other positive revisions than by negative revisions. Finally, revisions to previously-published GDP data do 
not seem to have a major impact on forecast revisions.  
 
The results for the model of revisions to forecasts of the growth rate of private consumption are displayed in 
columns four to six in table 2. All the conclusions drawn for revisions of GDP forecasts apply here with three 
exceptions. First, the size of the estimated β1 coefficient is a bit smaller than in the model of revisions of GDP 
forecasts, which makes sense because consumption is typically more persistent than GDP. Second, herding 
around the IMF forecasts of consumption growth is statistically significant and sizable. And third, there is no 
inertia in the revisions to forecasts of the growth rate of consumption. 
 
All in all, the findings obtained from the model of forecast revisions, in particular the strong herding behaviour 
around the consensus forecast, are consistent with irrational behaviour by some professional forecasters. Putting 
these findings together with those from the previous section, it could be argued that the inability by professional 
forecasters to predict recessions could be partly related to (i) the excessive backward-lookingness and 
overreaction to past data, and (ii) a strong herding behaviour. Excessive backward-lookingness may lead to big 
negative forecast errors at the beginning of recessions. The strong herding behaviour may prevent the forecasters 
perceiving the early signs of a recession from deviating too much from the consensus forecast. These results 
help explain the persistence of forecast errors, and are consistent with the findings by Galbraith and van Norden 
(2019) and by An et al. (2018), who observed that forecasters adjust their expectations when a recession is 




This paper investigates why professional forecasters are not effective in predicting economic recessions. To that 
end, I have used a Spanish survey of professional forecasters which allows to test whether the well-documented 
lack of success of the consensus forecast in predicting recessions is found using individual data as well. I also 
analyse if professional forecasters are more successful at predicting the subcomponents of GDP: private 
consumption, investment, government expenditure, exports and imports. 
 
The main findings of the paper may be summarised as follows. Professional forecasters are indeed too optimistic 
before recessions. In other words, the results reported by Dovern and Jannsen are also found with individual 
data. This finding applies to almost all subcomponents of GDP, no matter how volatile they are, suggesting that 
something more fundamental is at the root of the inability to predict the turning points of the cycle. Two factors 
may be playing a role in this regard. First, forecasters may be putting too much weight on past data (irrational 
backward-lookingness), which may lead to excessive optimism just before a recession occurs. Second, there 
seems to be evidence of a strong herding behaviour around the consensus forecast, which may prevent those 
forecasters perceiving the early signs of a recession from adjusting their expectations as much as needed to 
predict it. 
 
These findings have important implications for professional forecasters and for the institutions that survey them. 
The hypothesis that agents are rational but are subject to information rigidities, either rational inattention or 
noisy information, does not find support in the data. Instead, professional forecasters could improve their 
 




forecasting performance, first, by being more forward-looking and avoiding overreactions to recent data 
releases, and second, by not herding around the consensus forecast. The results of this paper suggest that these 
improvements will increase the chances of predicting recessions more accurately. Institutions like Funcas that 
run surveys of professional forecasters may want to survey density forecasts or probability distributions in 
addition to point forecasts. Density forecasts allow forecasters to report the probabilities of tail events, like the 
start of a recession. They might also remove the focus from the point forecasts, which are commonly perceived 
as a prediction conditional on remaining in the current phase of the cycle.    
 
Future directions for research include extending the analysis to forecasts for other countries with an aim to check 
whether the findings reported here are distinctive of the Spanish economy or can also be found in other 
jurisdictions. I also plan to combine the multiple univariate models presented in this paper into a multivariate 
analysis. In a multivariate framework, for example, revisions in the forecast of a variable may depend on forecast 
errors from other variables. Or forecast errors in one variable may depend on recent releases of other 
macroeconomic variables. In this context, a multivariate analysis could help increase the goodness of fit of the 
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Annex I. List of contributors to the Funcas survey and date of first reply 
 
Name of the participating institution First reply 
Instituto de Estudios Económicos (IEE) May 1999 
Instituto de Crédito Oficial (ICO) May 1999 
Argentaria 
Joins BBVA in January 2000 May 1999 
Banco Santander Central Hispano (BSCH) 
Banco Santander since September 2006 May 1999 
La Caixa 
Caixabank since November 2015 May 1999 
Funcas May 1999 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya (BBV) 
BBVA since January 2000 May 1999 
Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE) May 1999 
Centro de Predicción Económica (CEPREDE) May 1999 
Instituto Flores de Lemus de la Universidad Carlos III May 1999 
Caja Madrid  
Bankia since June 2011 June 1999 
Analistas Financieros Internacionales (AFI) November 1999 
Caixa Catalunya 
Acquired by BBVA in May 2015 November 1999 
Intermoney November 1999 
Consejo Superior de Cámaras de Comercio 
Cámara de Comercio de España since May 2017 March 2002 
Cemex February 2009 
Repsol April 2009 
Centro de Estudios de Economía de Madrid (CEEM-URJC) November 2009 
Solchaga Recio & asociados June 2010 
Esade November 2010 
CEOE September 2011 
Instituto de Macroeconomía y Finanzas - Universidad CJC September 2012 

























Annex II. Dates when the Funcas survey has been conducted 
 
Year Month 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1999     X X X  X X X  
2000 X  X  X  X  X  X  
2001 X  X  X  X  X  X  
2002 X  X  X  X  X   X 
2003  X X   X X   X  X 
2004  X  X  X X   X  X 
2005  X  X  X X   X  X 
2006  X  X  X X   X  X 
2007  X  X  X X   X  X 
2008  X  X X  X   X X  
2009  X  X  X X  X  X  
2010  X  X  X X  X  X  
2011  X  X  X X  X  X  
2012  X  X  X X  X   X 
2013  X X  X  X  X  X  
2014 X  X  X  X  X  X  
2015 X  X  X  X  X  X  
2016 X  X  X  X  X  X  



































Annex III. Average forecast errors by horizon lengths and phase of the business cycle 
Private consumption                                                     Private investment 
 
                       Government expenditure                                                           Exports 
 





Annex IV. Individual forecast errors for subcomponents of GDP for selected target years 
 
Private consumption 2003                                                    Investment 2013 
 
                        Government expenditure 2012                                                   Exports 2006 
 




Annex V: Estimation results of the empirical model of forecast errors for the subcomponents of GDP 
Private consumption 
          
 
Notes: P-values in parenthesis. Models M2 to M9 include individual dummy variables. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
-1.436 -1.163 -3.536 0.632 -0.427 -0.523 -0.838 -0.685
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1.239 -0.976 0.335 -0.464 0.219 -0.363 -0.166
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.16)
2.897 -0.221 -0.474 -0.093 -0.786 -1.800
(0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.46) (0.00) (0.00)
2.207 -0.268 -1.199 -1.067 -1.493 -1.117
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.014 -0.016 -0.012 -0.004 -0.010
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.66) (0.02)
0.000
(0.33)
-0.258 -0.218 -0.203 -0.164 -0.225
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.002
(0.24)
-0.038 -0.043 -0.046 -0.159 -0.103
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.005
(0.01)
0.16 0.154 0.145 0.248 0.160
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.004
(0.03)
0.151 0.094 0.095 0.249 0.075



























Observations 3051 3051 3051 3034 3034 2806 2806 2806 2806








































Notes: P-values in parenthesis. Models M2 to M9 include individual dummy variables. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
-2.722 -2.310 -7.601 2.143 2.303 -4.115 1.298 -0.325
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.39)
1.872 -3.258 1.729 0.820 -0.657 0.388 2.226
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.23) (0.00)
6.405 -0.689 -0.356 1.667 -0.492 -1.552
(0.00) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) (0.11) (0.00)
5.383 -0.537 -1.643 -0.146 -1.54 -2.157
(0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.067 -0.061 -0.067 -0.018 -0.061
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.00)
-0.002
(0.15)
-0.639 -0.669 -0.396 -0.363 -0.684
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.014
(0.00)
-0.279 -0.239 0.147 -0.148 -0.459
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00)
-0.004
(0.40)
0.408 0.418 0.222 0.381 0.565
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.002
(0.60)
0.357 0.323 0.101 0.333 0.245



























Observations 3051 3051 3051 3034 3034 2806 2806 2806 2806








































Notes: P-values in parenthesis. Models M2 to M9 include individual dummy variables. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
-0.007 -0.251 -1.576 -0.470 -1.930 -1.834 -3.280 -1.608
(0.94) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.739 -1.962 -0.064 -1.623 -0.774 -2.133 -0.888
(0.00) (0.00) (0.67) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
1.672 0.675 0.443 0.978 0.494 0.898
(0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
1.244 0.219 -0.074 0.924 0.695 -0.005
(0.00) (0.26) (0.74) (0.00) (0.02) (0.98)
0.037 0.017 0.028 0.023 0.025
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00)
-0.000
(0.71)
-0.088 0.011 -0.067 0.325 -0.022
(0.00) (0.42) (0.00) (0.00) (0.10)
-0.013
(0.00)
-0.159 -0.004 -0.114 0.081 -0.017
(0.00) (0.79) (0.00) (0.18) (0.20)
-0.003
(0.40)
0.085 -0.030 0.038 -0.027 -0.040
(0.00) (0.04) (0.02) (0.64) (0.00)
-0.001
(0.82)
0.058 -0.004 -0.054 -0.120 0.036



























Observations 2078 2078 2078 2061 2061 2041 2041 2041 2041
Adj. R2 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.14 0.47 0.56 0.49 0.40







































Notes: P-values in parenthesis. Models M2 to M9 include individual dummy variables. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
-0.626 0.039 -5.25 1.147 0.616 0.558 1.547 0.950
(0.00) (0.86) (0.00) (0.03) (0.18) (0.33) (0.00) (0.04)
3.021 -1.999 0.173 0.336 2.078 0.771 0.814
(0.00) (0.00) (0.68) (0.35) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03)
6.447 -0.146 -0.452 -0.202 -1.722 -1.861
(0.00) (0.77) (0.28) (0.70) (0.00) (0.00)
5.134 -0.424 -1.021 -0.200 -3.600 -1.545
(0.00) (0.41) (0.03) (0.74) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.144 -0.147 -0.141 -0.123 -0.136
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.001
(0.46)
-0.370 -0.417 -0.496 -0.598 -0.426
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.006
(0.46)
-0.061 -0.303 -0.466 -0.601 -0.286
(0.19) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.012
(0.10)
0.391 0.554 0.569 0.847 0.554
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.010
(0.17)
0.379 0.358 0.295 1.180 0.314



























Observations 3050 3050 3050 3033 3033 2805 2805 2805 2805
Adj. R2 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.23 0.30 0.56 0.63 0.57 0.53







































Notes: P-values in parenthesis. Models M2 to M9 include individual dummy variables. 
 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9
-2.814 -1.670 -9.879 1.548 0.037 -2.432 0.454 -0.090
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.95) (0.01) (0.27) (0.91)
5.197 -2.255 1.708 1.961 3.026 1.916 2.920
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
10.083 -0.499 -1.728 1.070 -3.630 -2.937
(0.00) (0.36) (0.00) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00)
7.126 0.077 -1.937 0.977 -4.966 -2.787
(0.00) (0.89) (0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.135 -0.118 -0.109 -0.122 -0.115
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.000
(0.83)
-0.715 -0.747 -0.671 -0.855 -0.752
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.003
(0.70)
-0.189 -0.423 -0.470 -0.650 -0.451
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
0.009
(0.20)
0.645 0.756 0.687 1.205 0.765
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
-0.017
(0.01)
0.456 0.424 0.192 1.375 0.387



























Observations 3050 3050 3050 3033 3033 2805 2805 2805 2805
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Annex VI. Percentage of times each extended model outperforms the original model when predicting the 
consensus forecast errors of the subcomponents of GDP 
                           Private consumption                                                                  Investment 
 
 
                        Government expenditure                                                                  Exports 
 
 




Annex VII. Relationship between forecast errors of the quarterly growth rate of private consumption and 
revisions to consumption forecasts 
 
                          Year-on-year forecasts                                                Quarter-on-quarter forecasts         
 
 
 
